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Abstract
This article makes a case that disability, particularly visual, hearing, and speech
impairments, played a significant role in Scottish Enlightenment thought. Focusing
on the work of Dugald Stewart, and in particular on his essay ‘Some account of a boy
born blind and deaf’, we argue that disability was a deep preoccupation of Scottish
Enlightenment thinkers who used it as a test case for various important philosophical
questions including those concerning ‘human nature’ and the limits of humanity. The
article starts by situating the philosophical debate in the context of lived experiences
of, and proximity to, impairment. The second part offers a close reading of Stewart’s
text ‘Some account’, about James Mitchell, a fourteen-year-old deafblind boy living in
the Scottish Highlands. The third part examines how disability operated in relation
to other hierarchies of difference that have been demonstrated to have been central
to Enlightenment thought, in particular that of race. Overall, the contribution this art-
icle makes is to introduce disability as an important, if currently overlooked, category in
Scottish Enlightenment thought that needs further investigation.
I
James Mitchell is the kind of person whom historians struggle to find in the
archives and about whom they rarely write. Born in Ardclach in Nairnshire
in the Scottish Highlands, Mitchell was deafblind, never received an education,
did not marry or have children, and left no known records himself. With the
notable later exceptions of the Americans Laura Bridgeman (1829–89) and
Helen Keller (1880–1968), deafblind people, perhaps even more so than
differently disabled populations, have long been almost completely absent
from historical research.1 This historiographical oversight seems to reflect
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which
permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
1 See, for example, Elisabeth Gitter, The imprisoned guest: Samuel Howe and Laura Bridgman, the ori-
ginal deaf-blind girl (New York, NY, 2001); David Wagner, The miracle worker and the transcendentalist:
Annie Sullivan, Franklin Sanborn, and the education of Helen Keller (Abingdon, 2015).
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the often-marginal position disabled people were assumed to have occupied in
society, as well as their not infrequent marginalization physically in institu-
tions. Although now burgeoning, the history of disability has in some ways
reflected this marginalization remaining somewhat peripheral to ‘mainstream’
historical research.2 Significant historiographical areas, perhaps none more so
than intellectual history, have continued to be written without reference to
either the concept or experience of disability.3 What we intend to do in this
article is to argue that, contrary to this historiographical neglect, disability –
particularly visual, hearing, and speech impairments – played an overlooked
but fundamental role in Scottish Enlightenment thought. We do this first
through exploring disability in its own right, and secondly by placing disability
in relation to that other key idea of the Enlightenment: race.
It is worth noting here that by ‘disability’ we refer to social and cultural
constructions of impairment, an unstable category that manifests differently
and is inflected differently across time and space.4 Indeed, looking back to
the Scottish Enlightenment, the idea of ‘disability’, at least in that specific
formulation, is to some extent anachronistic because the various impairments
that today constitute ‘disability’ were not grouped together in the same way.
The conflation between different types of visible and invisible disability had
not yet been cemented, nor had eugenicist ideas, which posited disability
as something to be eliminated, been constituted in their modern form.
Nonetheless, as this article seeks to demonstrate, something akin to what
we now call ‘disability’ was deeply preoccupying in eighteenth-century
Enlightenment thought, and informed fundamental moral, epistemological,
and ontological questions over the nature of humanity and human societal
development. We make the argument that disability was not only a condition
experienced by many Enlightenment thinkers and those in their social net-
works, but proved conceptually stimulating to a whole range of debates central
to their thinking, including those about the relationship between humans and
animals, what role the senses played on the mind, and the role that experience
played in human development and learning.
To make this argument in an article-length piece requires us to be
selective, and our focus here is on the writing and lectures of Dugald
2 For important works on the period, see, for example, David M. Turner, Disability in eighteenth-
century England: imagining physical impairment (New York, NY, and London, 2012); Helen Deutsch and
Felicity Nussbaum, eds., ‘Defects’: engendering the modern body (Ann Arbor, MI, 2000); and Felicity
Nussbaum, The limits of the human: fictions of anomaly, race, and gender in the long eighteenth century
(Cambridge, 2003).
3 For important exceptions, see Chris Mounsey’s edited collection The idea of disability in the
eighteenth century (Lanham, MD, and Plymouth, 2014), particularly Jess Keiser, ‘What’s the matter
with madness? John Locke, the association of ideas, and the physiology of thought’, and Emile
Bojesen, ‘Thomas Reid: power as first philosophy’, pp. 49–70 and 91–104. See also Nicholas
Mirzoeff, Silent poetry: deafness, sign and visual culture in modern France (Princeton, NJ, 1995);
Jonathan Rée, I see a voice: a philosophical history of language, deafness and the senses (London, 1999).
4 Mike Oliver, ‘The social model of disability: thirty years on’, Disability & Society, 28 (2013),
pp. 1024–6; Susan Wendell, The rejected body (New York, NY, 1996). See also Dan Goodley, Dis/ability
studies: theorizing disablism and ableism (Abingdon, 2014).
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Stewart (1753–1828), Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of
Edinburgh between 1780 and 1810, and, in particular, his encounter with
James Mitchell, an account of which was first published in 1815. Although
we focus on the Scottish Enlightenment, Stewart, like all his colleagues, was
embedded in wider European and colonial networks. For example, Stewart
made good use of Diderot’s ‘Letter on the blind for the use of those who
see’ (1749), which in turn cited examples of blind people, philosophers, and
physicians in Prussia, France, and England.5 Stewart also had close connections
to elite American settler colonists, including Thomas Jefferson, British imperial
administrators in India, and colonial adventurers to parts of Africa.6 We
begin by providing a general context for disability in Enlightenment thought,
before concentrating on Dugald Stewart’s essay on James Mitchell as a particu-
lar case-study. We then readjust the focus to think about the wider implica-
tions of this interest in disability including the relationship between
disability and other categories of ‘difference’ in Enlightenment thought, in
particular, ‘race’.
II
In eighteenth-century Britain, impairments such as blindness, deafness, mobil-
ity difficulties, chronic pain, and cognitive difficulties were highly prevalent in
everyday life. Due to limited record-keeping and varying definitions, the abso-
lute numbers of disabled people are very difficult to calculate with any accur-
acy. However, it is reasonable to assume that there were many disabled people
due to high incidences of contagious diseases (such as smallpox and measles),
which, when survived, often left disabling or disfiguring impairments, the con-
sequences of agricultural and early industrial accidents, and limited medical
and technological interventions for what today might be considered ‘correct-
able’ impairments. This high incidence of disability renders it unsurprising
that this issue not only affected Enlightenment thinkers themselves, but had
profound effects on their friends, family, and acquaintances.
The philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–96), Professor of Moral Philosophy at
the University of Glasgow, had a hearing impairment, whilst his colleague,
James Beattie (1735–1803), Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal
College, Aberdeen, suffered from ‘tender lungs’, which prevented him from
making progress with his philosophical work during the winter.7 Josiah
Wedgwood, the Staffordshire potter and member of the Lunar Society, was
lame in one leg as a result of smallpox in childhood, and later had to have
his leg amputated.8 His son, Tom Wedgwood, who studied under Stewart and
was resident in the Stewarts’ household between 1786 and 1788, suffered
5 Denis Diderot, ‘Letter on the blind for the use of those who see’, in Margaret Jourdain, trans.
and ed., Diderot’s early philosophical works (Chicago, IL, and London, 1916).
6 For Stewart’s connections to settler colonists and imperialists see Onni Gust, Unhomely empire:
whiteness and belonging, 1760–1830 (London, 2020), ch. 2.
7 Bojesen, ‘Thomas Reid’, p. 94; Elizabeth Montagu to James Beattie, London, 22 Mar. 1788,
University of Aberdeen Archives and Special Collections, MS 30/2/566, n.p.
8 Imelda Clift, The Wedgwood/Darwin dynasty (Ely, 2008), p. 13.
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with debilitating depression, migraines, and poor eyesight throughout his life.9
Stewart himself was overcome with grief when his son, George, died in 1809;
George had suffered with ill-health for at least a year, during which
Stewart’s own duties and studies had been put on hold in an attempt to find
a remedy.10 The same year, Stewart was visited in Edinburgh by Maria
Dundas, later known for her travel writing on India and South America,
which she published under her married name, Maria Graham. Her visit to
Edinburgh with her father and sister was undertaken partly in order to deliver
her younger brother to Braidwood’s Academy for the Deaf and Dumb, an
institution that Stewart himself was extremely interested in.11
The reoccurrence of discussions of disabling diseases in the letters and diar-
ies of elites supports Turner’s argument that disability was highly prevalent
and visible in eighteenth-century society.12 Although eighteenth-century nar-
ratives of the experience of disability are few and far between, sources do exist
that reveal first-person thinking about the position of those with bodily
impairments. Mary Prince, an enslaved African woman who travelled to
England in 1828, described her own physical disabilities as a result of brutal
labour regimes and physical punishment, as well as the physical impairments
of her fellow enslaved Africans, including ‘poor Daniel’ who was ‘lame in the
hip’.13 More commonly, it is the experiences of elites that survive in the his-
torical record. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s poem ‘Town Ecologues:
Saturday, the small-pox’ draws on her own experience of smallpox to critique
the commodification of beauty by illustrating the terrors of physical disfigure-
ment for elite, white women, whose beauty was the only source of power.14
Neither did the burden of normative standards of beauty fall only on the
shoulders of women. The Spectator’s ridicule of the ‘Ugly Club’ shows how
elite men, too, could be stigmatized as a result of physical difference, albeit
with less socio-economic consequences than for women. William Hay, MP
for Seaford, born with a spinal curvature, wrote of his own experiences of
physical impairment in what has been hailed as the first ‘disability’ mani-
festo.15 Hay’s Deformity: an essay is perhaps unique in its bringing together of
personal experience with philosophical questioning, but it illustrates David
Wright’s point that the disabled became increasingly important ‘test cases,
9 Gordon Macintyre, Dugald Stewart: the pride and ornament of Scotland (Brighton, 2003), p. 51;
Trevor H. Levere, ‘Wedgwood, Thomas (1771–1805)’, Oxford dictionary of national biography
(Oxford, 2004; online edn, May 2008) (www.oxforddnb/view/article/28967, accessed 9 Apr. 2015).
10 Dugald Stewart to William Drennan, Belfast, by Port Patrick, from Cairmur by Cowden burn,
Tweedale, 20 Sept. 1808, National Library of Scotland, d.12.30, n.p.; Macintyre, Dugald Stewart,
pp. 147–9.
11 Maria Graham, ‘Reminiscences’, in Rosemary Brunel Gotch, ed., Maria, Lady Callcott: the creator
of ‘Little Arthur’ (London, 1937), p. 71.
12 Turner, Disability in eighteenth-century England.
13 Mary Prince, The history of Mary Prince, a West Indian slave, related by herself (London, 1831). See
also Stefanie Kennedy, ‘“Let them be young and stoutly set in limbs”: race, labor and disability in
the British Atlantic world’, Social Identities, 21 (2014), pp. 41–2, 48.
14 Nussbaum, The limits of the human, p. 119.
15 Deutsch and Nussbaum, ‘Introduction’, in ‘Defects’, pp. 2–3.
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as quasi-experimental subjects of a more generalized Enlightenment project’.16
As Wright points out, the focus of philosophical questioning was often on peo-
ple, and particularly children born with sight, hearing, and speech impair-
ments. It was in this context of pervasive impairment and philosophical
discussion over the relationship between the senses and the mind that
Dugald Stewart presented his thoughts on James Mitchell, a young man living
in Nairnshire, in the Highlands of Scotland, who was born deafblind and was
consequently also unable to communicate orally, upon which this article will
now focus.
III
Although not the most original thinker, or the most prolific writer, of the
Scottish Enlightenment, Stewart was very much a part of that social and intel-
lectual world.17 He was well acquainted with the words, and the worlds, of
Adam Smith and William Robertson, whose works he collected for publication
after their deaths and whose biographies he wrote. He also attended, and sub-
sequently inherited, Adam Ferguson’s lectures on Moral Philosophy, and was
briefly a student of Thomas Reid at the University of Glasgow in 1771.18
Although based at the University of Edinburgh throughout his life, Stewart
had close ties with the ‘Common Sense’ school of philosophers in Aberdeen,
as well as with thinkers in France and the German principalities, including
Benjamin Constant and Madame de Staël. From the 1790s, Stewart published
a number of volumes on Moral Philosophy – Outlines of Moral Philosophy
(1793), and A dissertation on Moral Philosophy (1824), as well as his three-volume
Elements of the philosophy of the human mind (1792, 1814, and 1827).19 Yet his
influence as a thinker owes less to his published work, and more to his role
as a teacher and mentor at the University of Edinburgh for forty years.
Stewart taught Moral Philosophy, and later Political Economy, to three genera-
tions of young men, many of whom would go on to become writers, politicians,
and imperial administrators. Although his classrooms were closed to women,
he was closely acquainted with a number of prolific female writers, including
Maria Edgeworth, Elizabeth Hamilton, and Maria Graham; his second wife,
Helen D’Arcy was a well-known poet.20
16 David Wright, Downs: the history of a disability (New York, NY, 2010), p. 33.
17 See Knud Haakonssen and Paul Wood, ‘Introduction’, History of European Ideas, 38 (2012),
pp. 1–4; and Donald Winch, ‘The system of the north: Dugald Stewart and his pupils’, in Stefan
Collini, Donald Wince, and John Burrow, eds., That noble science of politics: a study in nineteenth-
century intellectual history (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 23–61; Paul Wood, ‘Dugald Stewart and the
invention of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Paul Wood, ed., The Scottish Enlightenment: essays in
reinterpretation (Rochester, NY, 2000), pp. 1–35. See also Gordon Macintyre’s biography, Dugald
Stewart: the pride and ornament of Scotland (Brighton, 2003).
18 Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, p. 21.
19 See Michael Brown, ‘Stewart, Dugald (1753–1828)’, Oxford dictionary of national biography
(Oxford, 2004; online edn, May 2008) (www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/
9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-26471, accessed 15 Mar. 2021).
20 Jane Rendall, ‘“Elementary principles of education”: Elizabeth Hamilton, Maria Edgeworth and
the uses of common sense philosophy’, History of European Ideas, 39 (2013), pp. 613–30.
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Stewart’s ‘Some account of a boy born blind and deaf’ was published in
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1815 and then republished in
the third volume of Elements of the philosophy of the human mind (1827).21
Although it was his first, and only, publication dedicated to discussing ques-
tions of disability, it is clear that his interest in physical impairment went
back at least twenty years prior to the publication of the ‘Account’.
Students’ notes from his lectures on Moral Philosophy, dating back to 1793,
record references of blindness, deafness, and physical differences as part of
his discussion of human capacities.22 It is also clear from these notes that
Stewart’s understanding and perception of physical impairment, particularly
deafness, changed over the course of his lifetime. Whereas his earlier lectures
are relatively dismissive of the capacities of people born deaf, referring to
them as ‘in a state of mental debility approaching to the condition of idiots’,
his later lectures focus more on the progress made in educating the deaf.
Citing the work of famous educators of the deaf, Thomas Braidwood and the
Abbé de l’Épée, as well as essays from the Transactions of the Royal Society,
Stewart’s later lectures employ a more sympathetic and respectful tone, as
well as illustrating a greater depth of understanding about physical impair-
ment in general, and deafness in particular. (It is strange that although
Stewart engaged extensively with his friend and fellow Scottish philosopher,
Lord Monboddo, on language, he did not make any reference to Monboddo’s
discussion of deafness in Of the origin and progress of language.23) By the time
Stewart gave his paper on Mitchell at the Royal Society, his philosophical inter-
est in impairment as part of the study of the human mind was clearly well
known amongst a wide network of scholars, amongst whom he was repre-
sented as an authority. In their review of Stewart’s paper, for example, The
Edinburgh Review stated its confidence in Stewart, stating that Mitchell’s
‘case’ had ‘fortunately fallen into the hands of one of the greatest master of
the philosophy of the human mind’.24
21 Dugald Stewart, ‘Some account of a boy born blind and deaf, collected from authentic sources
of information; with a few remarks and comments’, Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 7
(Edinburgh and London, 1815), pp. 5–78; Dugald Stewart, Elements of the philosophy of the human
mind, III (London, 1827), reprinted in Sir William Hamilton, ed., The collected works of Dugald
Stewart, IV (Edinburgh, 1854), pp. 300–72. Our references refer to this latter version.
22 See Sofias Walker, ‘Abbreviations from Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 1778–9’, Edinburgh
University Archives (EAU), Gen 2023, vol. 2; Anon., ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy delivered by
Prof Dugald Stewart, 1789 and 1790’, EUA, Gen 1987–9; Archibald Bell, ‘Lectures on Moral
Philosophy by Dugald Stewart, delivered at the University of Edinburgh, 1793–4’, EUA, Dc4.97;
J. Lee Eden, ‘Attendance at class, 1796, -7, -8, -9’, EUA, Dc8.143; James Bridges, ‘Lectures on
Moral Philosophy, 1801–2’, EUA, Dc5.88; John Dow, ‘Lectures on Political Economy by Dugald
Stewart, 1808–9’, EUA, Dc.3105, vol. 1; Archibald Alison, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 1808’,
EUA, Gen. 1382–5, vols. 1–4.
23 See Jules Paul Siegel, ‘The Enlightenment and the evolution of a language of signs in France
and England’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 30 (1969), n. 39, p. 113.
24 Art XII. Some account of a boy born blind and deaf. By Dugald Stewart, Esq. F.R.S. Edinburgh, &c.
(Read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh.) 4to. pp. 70 in The Edinburgh Review, or Critical Journal
for July 1812 to Nov. 1812, v.20 (Edinburgh, 1812), p. 468.
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Mitchell’s case clearly interested a wide range of philosophers, many of
them members of the Royal Society. Stewart included their correspondence
about the boy’s situation as part of his ‘Account’, so that the essay itself
becomes less an individually authored piece and more a pastiche of observa-
tions and interjections. Stewart had first been alerted to Mitchell’s situation
by James Wardrop (1782–1869), an opthalmic surgeon, who had studied
Moral Philosophy under Stewart during his period as a student at Edinburgh
University.25 Wardrop dedicated his own account of Mitchell’s impairments
and the operation he performed in an attempt to remove his cataracts, pub-
lished in 1813, to Stewart. He concluded his account by acknowledging
Stewart’s ‘lively interest’ in the case and his hope that ‘everything will be
done which can promote the happiness of this interesting youth, whilst science
will reap the benefit of the observations of one of the most ingenious and most
profound philosophers of the present day’.26 George Glennie, Professor of
Moral Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen, had gained an account
of Mitchell’s situation through the auspices of a local clergyman to whom
he posed a number of questions. The answers to his ‘Queries’ are included in
Stewart’s ‘Account’, as are the supplementary observations and correspond-
ence between John Gordon, a doctor and member of the Royal Society, and
Stewart. The well-known philosopher, historian, and member of parliament
for Nairnshire, Sir James Mackintosh, also visited the Mitchell family in 1812
and reported his observations to Stewart. This philosophical interest in
James Mitchell was sustained throughout Stewart’s lifetime, and beyond; in
the version published in Collected works, a note added by the editor, Sir
William Hamilton, brings James Mitchell’s history up to 1854, whilst the last
account addressed to Stewart is dated 1826, two years before his own death
and fourteen years after his initial encounter with Mitchell, thus revealing a
sustained interested in Mitchell’s case. These essays, reports, and letters
between scholars and friends illustrate the way that philosophical debate
and knowledge formation was consolidated through formal and informal
networks.
‘Some account of a boy born blind and deaf’ introduces the reader to the
fourteen-year-old James Mitchell, a clergyman’s son, who lived with his par-
ents and five siblings in Ardclach in Nairnshire in the Scottish Highlands.
The details of Mitchell’s situation and habits were represented by his older
sister, Jane Mitchell, who appears to have acted as a gateway to the world
for Mitchell, and as an interpreter of his world to the various people who
were interested in him. In a letter to Stewart, Glennie wrote that Jane
‘seems to have a greater ascendancy over him, and more power of managing
him than any other person’.27 She was able to communicate to James using
basic signs addressed to his sense of touch (such as patting him on the
25
‘James Wardrop’, in The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, https://archiveandlibrary.
rcsed.ac.uk/surgeon/3771486-james-wardrop, accessed 15 Mar. 2921.
26 James Wardrop, History of James Mitchell, a boy born blind and deaf, with an account of the operation
performed for the recovery of his sight (London and Edinburgh, 1813), p. 43.
27 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 316.
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head) and he was able to comprehend whether she approved of his behaviour
or otherwise through these means.28 Stewart and his fellow scholars saw in
Jane Mitchell a conduit through which to experiment with alternative
modes of education in order to enable James to communicate his ideas, includ-
ing teaching him the alphabet by relating words to feelings and experiences.29
Jane Mitchell was, Sir James Mackintosh wrote, a ‘young woman of most pleas-
ing appearance and manners, distinguished by a very uncommon degree of
modesty, caution and precision in her accounts of him’.30 Clearly very
impressed by her kindness to her brother, Mackintosh suggested that ‘the
habitual exercise of ingenious benevolence seems to me to have left its traces
on her countenance, and to have bestowed on her naturally agreeable features,
an expression more delightful than beauty’.31 Jane’s role in supporting her
brother conformed to Enlightenment ideals of women as thoughtful and ben-
evolent carers. Yet her actions went much beyond that remit; she was instru-
mental in analysing and interpreting (rather than just observing) her brother’s
behaviour for the elite, male audience that gathered around him. The Edinburgh
Review’s reference to ‘that manual language which was conceived by the Abbé
de l’Épée and invented by Miss Mitchell’ goes some way towards acknowledg-
ing the importance of both her role and contribution to knowledge forma-
tion.32 In this respect, although barred by her gender from formal
participation in scholarly discussions, Jane Mitchell’s translation of her broth-
er’s actions played a fundamental role in wider discourses of the human mind,
human development, and progress.
Stewart’s ‘Account’ is an appeal to the sensibilities, as well as to the philo-
sophical and anatomical interests, of his fellow scholarly men. He concluded by
stating that in writing the report, ‘I was partly influenced by the hope, that it
may possibly be the means of securing a decent provision for the individual to
whom it relates’ as well as to his mother and sister.33 His reference to James
Mitchell’s case as a ‘melancholy history’ was presumably intended to rouse
the charitable sentiments of his colleagues, for the essay itself appears any-
thing but melancholy, offering a humanizing account of Mitchell whose char-
acter, naughtiness, and sensibility shines through into the narrative.34 The
essay is replete with vivid details painting a picture of Mitchell’s life in
rural Scotland, from his interactions with servants, to his relationship with
his parents and sister, to the mischief he dreamed up, to his love of tobacco
and new clothes. In his letter to Stewart, Glennie claimed that ‘notwithstand-
ing his unfortunate defects’ his countenance ‘does by no means indicate fatu-
ity’, and went on to note that the ‘lineaments of thought were very describable
28 John Gordon, ‘Supplement to the foregoing account of James Mitchell’, in Stewart, ‘Some
account’, p. 354.
29 Ibid., p. 355.
30 Sir James Mackintosh, ‘Letter from Sir James Mackintosh to Mr Stewart, Edinburgh 5th
November 1812’, in Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 359.
31 Ibid., pp. 359–60.
32 Art XII. Some account, p. 470.
33 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 336.
34 Ibid., p. 300.
8 Esme Cleall and Onni Gust
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X21000133
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.0.204.215, on 21 Jul 2021 at 16:07:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
on it’, and that he adopted a range of appropriate expressions including look-
ing ‘composed and sedate’ (at church and during family prayers), ‘animated’
(upon the appearance of a stranger), and ‘feroci[ous]’ (when offended or
enraged).35 These ‘countenances’ certainly played an important role in endear-
ing potential sponsors to support James Mitchell as a person, yet they were
also fundamental to the philosophical impetus that underpinned James
Mitchell as a case-study. Indeed, Stewart’s appeal made clear how inseparable
the two positions were when he stated that by providing financially for James
Mitchell and his family, the Society would at least be preventing any ‘regrets
which might afterwards be felt, if so rare and opportunity for philosophical
observation and experiment should be suffered to pass before our eyes,
without any attempt being made to turn it to the advantage of science’.36
Stewart and his correspondents’ interest in James Mitchell’s situation was
due to its relevance to a philosophical discussion around the question: what
impact does deafblindness have on the human mind? The Edinburgh Review
claimed that Mitchell’s case represented ‘the most interesting anomalies in
the natural history of the human species’, whilst Wardrop described it as ‘a
most wonderful and instructive experiment instituted by Nature herself to
illustrate the progress of human intellect, to mark the influence of the differ-
ent organs of perception in the development of its various faculties; thereby
realising what many philosophers have contemplated in imagination, but
never before witnessed.’37 Stewart himself understood his encounter with
Mitchell as an opportunity of ‘verifying or correcting’ the surgeon William
Cheselden’s famous 1728 account of improving the vision of a boy upon
which doubt had been recently cast.38 Cheselden’s account had, amongst
other things, sought to answer the ‘Molyneux question’ first posed by
William Molyneux, whose wife was blind, and then taken up by John Locke,
as to whether a person blind from birth or early infancy would, if suddenly
to regain their sight as through surgery, be able to connect their tactile knowl-
edge of certain objects (such as a cube and a sphere) with the newly acquired
visual sight of them. In Cheselden’s account, the boy who had been operated
on could distinguish the objects placed before him as his bandage slipped
off, providing proof of innate knowledge. Molyneux’s question and the situ-
ation of the blind had far-reaching implications for philosophies of the
human mind, and recurred in different guises across Enlightenment philoso-
phy.39 That Mitchell was deaf as well as blind would, to Stewart’s first thoughts
on the subject, enhance the experiment further, but after consideration,
35 Professor Glennie, ‘Answers to some queries addressed to a clergyman in the county of
Moray…with respect to James Mitchell, a lad sixteen years of age, who was born blind and deaf’,
in Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 314.
36 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 337.
37 Art XII. Some account, p. 462; Wardrop, History of James Mitchell, p. 42.
38 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 301.
39 See Kate Tunstall, Blindness and the Enlightenment: an essay (London, 2011). Chris Mounsey’s
Sight correction: vision and blindness in eighteenth-century Britain (Charlottesville, VA, 2019) was pub-
lished after we wrote the main body of this article, but it provides an important addition to the
research on blindness, as well as philosophical debates on blindness.
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Stewart concluded that due to the considerable communications they had with
Mitchell, and due to the fact that pre-surgery Mitchell already seemed respon-
sive to light and colour, he was not a suitable candidate for furthering
Cheselden’s work.40 Nonetheless, James Mitchell continued to prove of great
interest to Stewart and his friends who were familiar with the contemporan-
eous developments in France where Abbé de l’Épée and Abbé Sicard were revo-
lutionizing deaf education. In particular, the celebrated pupil Jean Massieu, a
former student and prodigy of Sicard who had been widely used to demon-
strate the successes and potential of deaf education and had gone on himself
to be a significant educator of deaf children, appears as a comparator in their
writing. Whilst, unlike Mitchell, Massieu did not have a visual impairment, the
fact that he had started his education when only two years younger than
Mitchell was held as somewhat encouraging, though elsewhere the differences
between the two young men were emphasized.41
The prospect of Mitchell’s education was not so much considered in terms
of a humanitarian or benevolent intervention but in terms of a scientific
experiment in the ability of deafblind people, in general, to be educated.
Such an experiment had also motivated the French deaf educationalists. As
Stewart translates the preface to one of Sicard’s writings on the subject, we
see ‘what an immense distance from other men, would a being so cruelly
degraded be placed; and how difficult to transport him across that gulf by
which he is separated from the rest of his species’.42 Such gulfs haunted the
minds of Enlightenment thinkers; disabled people posed powerful challenges
to the criteria upon which their ideas about universal manhood were based.
Stewart understood Sicard’s aim to be of a different and of a higher nature
than simply teaching the deaf to speak. It was not, Stewart wrote, ‘to astonish
the vulgar by the sudden conversion of a dumb child into a speaking automa-
ton, but, by affording scope to those means by which Nature herself has pro-
vided for the gradual evolution of our intellectual powers, to convert his
pupil into a rational and moral being’.43 Stewart was familiar with the
French educationalists, as well as with a range of rather more obscure
British educators of the deaf including the Scottish teacher and linguist
George Dalgarno, demonstrating an interest in deaf education beyond what
could have been gleaned from a passing interest. Indeed, in addition to their
hopes of correcting Mitchell’s vision and hearing through surgery, one of
the intentions of Stewart’s account was to devise a plan of education that
would enable him to communicate with society beyond simple gesture. In a let-
ter to Stewart published as part of the ‘Account’, Dr Gordon suggested using a
raised surface to teach Mitchell the alphabet and eventually to read and write
through touch.44 For philosophical rather than humanitarian reasons, Stewart
40 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 306.
41 Ibid., p. 333. For more on Massieu, see Harlan Lane, When the mind hears: a history of the deaf
(London, 1984), pp. 17–24.
42 Sicard quoted in Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 328.
43 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 332.
44 John Gordon, ‘Letter from Dr Gordon to Mr Stewart, Edinburgh, October 26, 1812’, in ibid.,
p. 355.
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regretted that these plans were never put into action: ‘how invaluable was the
opportunity which has been thus lost of adding to the Natural History of the
Human Mind’.45
Stewart understood James Mitchell’s ‘case’ to provide valuable insights into
a debate over the relationship between the mind and the body, and the indi-
vidual and society. From the early eighteenth century, sensory impressions
took on an increasingly important role in philosophical understandings of
the constitution of the human mind. As G.J. Barker-Benfield has illustrated,
the discussion of ‘sensibility’ derived from Isaac Newton’s work into sight
and optics, in which he had posited visual perception as the grounds upon
which truth was established. Newton’s theory was developed and taken in a
different direction by John Locke, who argued that the mind gained under-
standing through the impressions that were made upon it by perceptions,
and that it was these impressions that formed the foundation of knowledge
and identity. The argument became the basis upon which scholars, including
Descartes, Hartley, and Helvetius, developed arguments for the co-relationship
between physical sensibility and the workings of the human mind.46 At the
centre of this dispute were versions of the Cartesian question of the mind/
body duality, which scholars discussed, in part, through a consideration of
the distinction between humans and animals. Were animals mere material
automatons who lacked a mind (and therefore a soul) as Descartes implied?
Or was there a constitutive relationship between the body and the mind that
endowed animals, as well as humans, with the ability to think, as Erasmus
Darwin amongst others claimed?47 In the third volume of his Elements of the
philosophy of the human mind, Stewart navigated these questions by arguing
that although animals and humans had many faculties in common, only
humans had the ability to use reason. He defined ‘reason’ as the ‘capacity of
carrying on processes of thought by the help of artificial signs and arriving
at scientific conclusions’.48 Stewart’s use of ‘artificial signs’ aligned him with
Thomas Reid’s ‘Common Sense’ philosophy, which made a distinction between
‘natural signs’ representing universal and God-given meaning, and ‘artificial
language’, which referred to the meaning developed by humans in society.49
For Stewart, ‘man’ was unique amongst sentient beings for ‘his’ ability to cat-
egorize meaning, communicate that meaning through language, and employ
those ideas to affect future change and ‘progress’.
Physical impairments provided important case-studies for this philosoph-
ical discussion about the relationship between the body and the mind, and
45 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 370.
46 G. J. Barker-Benfield, The culture of sensibility: sex and society in eighteenth-century Britain
(Chicago, IL, 1996), ch. 1; Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC,
2009), pp. 9–11.
47 See Stewart, ‘Faculties of man and brutes compared’, in Elements, III, pp. 250–99.
48 Stewart, Elements, III, p. 295.
49 Stewart defines the difference between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ signs, as well as his debt to
Reid, clear in his lectures on Moral Philosophy. See, for example, Archibald Alison, ‘Lectures’,
EUA, Gen 1382–3, 1808–9, pp. 77 and 2. For the wider context, see Knud Haakonsen, Natural law
and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1996), ch. 7.
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ultimately what constituted the human. In Elements, as in his earlier lectures
on Moral Philosophy, Stewart cited debates dating back to Aristotle and
Galen over the necessity of touch, and thereby of hands, to the human imagin-
ation. He dismissed the idea that hands were fundamental to the development
of human ingenuity by citing an example of a woman named Biffin from
Somersetshire who had no hands and so used her mouth and tongue to do
embroidery, and could write by holding a pen between her cheek and shoulder.
Stewart had met this woman in Edinburgh and concluded that ‘her intellectual
powers seem to me far above the ordinary level, and the expression of her
countenance (in particular of her eye) was good-humoured and cheerful, yet
thoughtful and interesting’.50 This evidence, as well as the example of a
German man called Buckinger who had been exhibited in Edinburgh earlier
in the eighteenth century for his ability to play musical instruments, write,
and draw despite not having arms or legs, proved that it was the human
mind that was fundamentally different from that of animals.51 James
Mitchell’s case, however, proved an additional challenge, because his lack of
ability to communicate rational ideas either through written or oral commu-
nication raised the question of whether he possessed rationality. As Stewart
explained in a footnote to the introduction of his ‘Account of a boy’, the details
of Mitchell’s case ‘bear on some of the most interesting questions which relate
to the characteristical endowments of the human mind’.52 Key questions posed
to Jane Mitchell by Mr Glennie about her brother, and reported to
Stewart – ‘Does he discover any sense of danger?’; ‘Has he knowledge of the
use of things?’; ‘Does he love to associate with boys, and engage in play?’;
‘Does he apprehend the distinction of ranks?’ –were all designed to understand
the extent of his cognition, and therefore his humanity.53
Stewart and his colleagues were particularly interested in Mitchell’s ability
to learn from his actions, feelings, and experiences in the past, in order to
anticipate the future. Stewart relates numerous instances, including being dis-
couraged from crossing a narrow and perilous bridge over some rapid water
near the manse by being pushed into the river (at a safer part),54 jumping
out the way of horse and carts after he had been run over by one,55 and worry-
ing that he would lose his sister after the death of his mother, in order to con-
firm that Mitchell was as capable as an able-bodied person of acting rationally
upon the basis of experience.56 John Gordon, a doctor who also wrote to
Stewart about the case, remarked that ‘The train of his thoughts seem to be
regulated by that of the same principles as the soundest minds. His actions nei-
ther indicate incoherence nor fatuity; but everything he does appears capable
50 Stewart, Elements, III, pp. 285–6.
51 Ibid., p. 285.
52 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 300.
53 Glennie and Miss Jane Mitchell, ‘A series of questions respecting James Mitchell’, in Stewart,
‘Some account’, pp. 346–8.
54 Gordon, ‘Supplement’, p. 322.
55 Jane Mitchell, ‘Letter from Jane Mitchell to Sir T. Dick Lauder’, in Stewart, ‘Some account’,
p. 363.
56 Ibid., p. 362.
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of being easily traced to rational motives.’57 Those writing of Mitchell were
also at great pains to stress that he experienced a range of emotions from
grief, on the death of his father, to curiosity – his predominant feeling when
a stranger entered the manse, to joy and mirth. The grief James Mitchell
felt upon his father Mr Mitchell’s death is returned to several times, by the
different contributors to the series of letters of which the essay is largely com-
posed and is highly significant. Although the exact manner in which James
Mitchell conducted himself was somewhat disputed, all agreed that he experi-
enced sorrow, grief, and a realization of the loss he had sustained. The later
death of his mother, and suspected fears that he might one day lose his sister,
is also discussed in this regard. Mitchell’s expression of emotion, albeit
through non-linguistic means, provided proof not only of his inherent human-
ness, but also of his relative refinement despite his lack of formal education
and his apparent solitude and isolation in ‘the midst of society’.58 Despite
his differences from early eighteenth-century philosophers of moral senti-
ment, Stewart generally agreed that great susceptibility to both physical and
emotional pain was indicative of a higher level of sensibility, refinement,
and civilization. According to this paradigm, the capacity to feel was a signifier
of difference, demarcating the boundary between ‘civilized’ and ‘savage’, and
intersecting with this binary, between the human and the animal.
That James Mitchell was clearly susceptible to ‘benevolent feelings’ pro-
vided proof that disabled people, despite, in some cases, their limited ability
to interact with society using language, were capable of a complex range of
emotions. This was important because it suggested that disabled people, and
those with sensory impairments in particular, were able to affectively relate
to, and identify with, another person’s experience – an ability that Smith
referred to as ‘sympathy’. ‘Sympathy’, Smith had argued in Theory of moral sen-
timents (1759), was what enabled humans to form connections to each other as
part of society, and motivated them towards acts of virtue.59 If people with dis-
abilities, and particularly sensory impairments, were able to feel sympathy
then they would necessarily be capable of virtue, too. In his essay ‘Of deform-
ity’ (1612), Francis Bacon had argued that that deformity, whilst not a sign of
innate sin, would necessarily impair the development of a virtuous character
because of the disadvantages that the ‘deformed’ face in society. Apparently
being ‘void of natural affection’, Bacon argued that ‘deformed persons’ are
‘extreme bold’, habituated to exposure to ‘scorn’ and ‘stirrith’ in ‘industry’
they ‘watch and observe the weakness of others, that they may have somewhat
to repay’.60 William Hay’s response, in his Deformity: an essay (1754), argued that
because the disabled did not automatically gain society’s approbation, and had
57 Gordon, ‘Supplement’, p. 322.
58 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 300.
59 Adam Smith, The theory of moral sentiments. Or, an essay towards an analysis of the principles by
which men naturally judge concerning the conduct and character, first of their neighbours, and afterwards
of themselves. To which is added, A dissertation on the origins of language (4th edn, Edinburgh and
London, 1774; first published 1759).
60 Francis Bacon, ‘Of deformity’ (1625), in The essays, or councils, civil and moral of Sir Francis Bacon
(London, 1696), p. 117.
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to work harder to show their virtues in order to counter prejudice, they ultim-
ately achieved more goodwill from able-bodied members of society than those
whose exterior beauty raised expectations of inner virtue.61 In effect, Hay
argued that the disabled, or at least elite men with disabilities, were likely
to be more virtuous than their able-bodied contemporaries. Although Stewart
did not reference either essay, his narrative of James Mitchell provided evi-
dence of the ability of people with sensory impairments to interact meaning-
fully and benevolently with the rest of the world, as well as to earn a degree of
affection from society at large.
IV
Stewart published the ‘Account of James Mitchell’ in Transactions of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, the vehicle of the Royal Society, which was established
in 1665 in order to gather and support scientific knowledge. The Society pri-
marily comprised men of high social status, with some from the middling
orders, who were actively engaged with a wide range of natural philosophy.62
As post-colonial and feminist scholars have long argued, the ideas of this
group played a constitutive role in consolidating and naturalizing hierarchies
of human difference that developed during the Enlightenment period.
Classifying human bodies on the basis of phenotype, anatomy, and reproduct-
ive capacity, Enlightenment thinkers represented the white, able-bodied male
as the normative standard against which all other bodies were situated and
judged.63 In this final section of this article, we place Stewart’s representation
of Mitchell’s life in the context of historiographical critiques of Enlightenment
discourses of difference in general, taking an intersectional approach to situate
disability alongside other constructs of difference in Stewart’s writing,
principally race. We ask to what extent Mitchell was defined through the
same discourses of difference that dehumanized non-white Others. What are
the limits and possibilities of adding ‘disability’ to the ideology of white,
male supremacy that haunts modern Europe, as well as its former and
contemporary colonies? And what does exploring disability alongside race
do to expose the limits of ‘universal’ theories of human nature in the
Enlightenment ‘science of man’?
Work on the history of disability has emphasized the presence of discourses
of dehumanization and freakery in the construction of what it meant to be
disabled.64 Under the guise of ‘scientific curiosity’ and the development of
‘natural history’, the Royal Society, like many male-only Enlightenment
61 William Hay, Deformity: an essay (London, 1754), pp. 18–19.
62 Richard Sorrenson, ‘Towards a history of the Royal Society in the eighteenth century’, Notes
and Records of the Royal Society of London, 50 (1996), pp. 29–46.
63 Ann Stoler, ‘Reason aside: reflections on Enlightenment and Empire’, in Graham Huggan, ed.,
The Oxford handbook of post-colonial studies (Oxford, 2013), pp. 39–66; Felicity Nussbaum, Torrid zones
(Baltimore, MD, and London, 1995), epilogue; Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial eyes: travel writing and
transculturation (London and New York, NY, 1992), ch. 1.
64 See, for example, Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Extraordinary bodies: figuring physical disability
in American culture and literature (New York, NY, 1997).
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institutions, configured certain bodies as objects, rather than as agents. In
some respects, Stewart’s representation of James Mitchell as a ‘rare’ example
of a case-study that provided ‘data for some important conclusions concerning
the capacities of the Human Mind, considered in contrast with the instincts of
Brutes’, supports this critique.65 As the letters between scholarly gentlemen
suggest, Mitchell also appears to have become something of a landmark curi-
osity in the Highlands of Scotland, a region that was itself the focus of the elite
touristic gaze during this period. At the same time, however, the ‘Account’
lacks the kind of affective de-humanization that would seem to accompany
the emergence of what Rosemarie Garland Thomson refers to as a modern
‘freak discourse’. Thomson argues that the Enlightenment period saw the
transformation of aberrant bodies from ‘prodigious monsters’ to ‘the abnor-
mal, the intolerable’. Displayed as objects in museums and exhibitions, or insti-
tutionalized in hospitals for medical observation, ‘freaks’ were denied agency
and humanity.66 This is in stark contrast to representations of James Mitchell’s
life. Living in his family home, it is clear from the accounts provided that
James Mitchell was able to exert a considerable amount of agency over his ser-
vants, family, and friends –whatever his speech and language difficulties, he
was not an isolated individual or one confined within an institutional setting,
nor, in the neighbourhoods where he was well known, was he treated as a
‘freak’. The ability of Mitchell to communicate with his social network and
they with him, albeit to a limited degree, suggests a tacit acceptance of disabil-
ity as a fact of life that did little to diminish from a sense of belonging to the
family, the community, or class hierarchy.
But this did not mean that Mitchell’s condition was unconditionally
accepted. Another trope in the way in which disability starts to be seen in
the modern period is thinking about disability not simply as a God-given
way of being, but as a ‘problem’ that needed treatment and, increasingly, med-
ical intervention. Stewart and his friends understood Mitchell as a body that
needed fixing, despite the fact that there were no obvious signs that he was
unhappy as a result of his impairments, and that he was clearly distressed
by the attempts to operate on his eyes.67 Nonetheless, Stewart hoped that
Mitchell would regain more sight through surgical interventions, and also
believed that education would also improve his situation. This ambition ties
in with ideas of the ‘perfectability’ of human nature and human societies,
which was a key component of Thomas Reid’s ‘Common Sense’ philosophy.
In his Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense (1764),
Reid had argued that
savage hath within him the seeds of the logician, the man of taste and
breeding, the orator, the statesman, the man of virtue, and the saint;
which seeds, though planted in his mind by nature, yet through want
65 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 335.
66 Rosemarie Garland Thomson, ‘Introduction’, in Thomson, ed., Freakery: cultural spectacles of the
extraordinary body (New York, NY, 1996), pp. 4–5. See also Sadiah Qureshi, ‘Displaying Sara
Baartman, the “Hottentot Venus”’, History of Science, 42 (2004), pp. 233–57.
67 Gordon, ‘Supplement’, p. 320.
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of culture and exercise, must lie for ever buried, and be hardly perceivable
by himself or by others.68
Stewart developed his mentor’s position, but placed more emphasis on the role
of education in perfecting and civilizing humankind. Education, he argued in
the first volume of Elements of the philosophy of the human mind, was key to ‘guid-
ing the intellectual and moral powers’ in order to ‘cultivate although the vari-
ous principles of our nature, both speculative and active, in such a manner as
to bring them to the greatest perfection of which they are susceptible’.69 By
attempting to develop a system through which to educate James Mitchell,
Stewart and his contemporaries were endeavouring to prove that the human
mind was capable of ‘perfectibility’ even where the body was not itself
‘perfectly’ formed.
Both Reid’s and Stewart’s notions of ‘perfectibility’ intersected with ideas
of racial superiority. Unlike their colleagues, including Lord Monboddo, nei-
ther Reid nor Stewart were explicitly engaged in emergent race science, with
its focus on explaining Africans’ darker skin tone in an attempt to resolve
questions about the origins of humankind.70 Stewart was explicitly critical
of the slave trade and slavery in the Americas, stating that ‘it is a reproach
to those enlightened times that after slavery has been banished from Europe,
it should be again revived in the European colonies’.71 Yet neither did
Stewart or Reid ever question the superiority of white, European ‘civiliza-
tion’, and whether they intended it or not, the philosophical arguments
about perfectibility enabled a discourse of white supremacy. Reid may
have understood every human to have the potential for ‘civilization’, but
that did not mean that every society would necessarily ‘thrive and grow
up to great perfection’. Some societies, he argued, would take a ‘perverted’
course, others would stall on the route to perfection, and still others
would die out completely.72 The extermination of certain ‘races’, understood
as part of a Divine Plan, provided ‘enlightened’ imperialists with a way of
denying any responsibility for the annihilation of Native Americans and,
later Aboriginal Australians, as a result of settler colonialism. It would
take until mid-nineteenth-century eugenics, however, for the same logic to
be explicitly applied to disabled people.
68 Thomas Reid, An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense (London, 1823),
p. 4.
69 Dugald Stewart, Elements of the philosophy of the human mind, I (London, 1792), p. 11.
70 Silvia Sebastiani, ‘Challenging boundaries: apes and savages in Enlightenment’, in Silvia
Sebastiani, Wulf Hund, and Charles Mills, eds., Simianization: apes, gender, class and race (Zurich,
2015), pp. 105–38; Silvia Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment: race, gender, and the limits of progess
(Basingstoke, 2013), ch. 3; Colin Kidd, The forging of races: race and scripture in the Protestant
Atlantic world (Cambridge, 2006); Andrew Curran, The anatomy of blackness: science and slavery in
an age of Enlightenment (Baltimore, MD, 2011); Roxann Wheeler, The complexion of race: categories
of difference in eighteenth-century British culture (Philadelphia, PA, 2000).
71 Walker, ‘Abbreviations’, p. 365.
72 Reid, An inquiry, p. 4. For a discussion of Stewart’s relationship to Reid and ‘Common Sense’
philosophy, see C. B. Bow, Common sense in the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford, 2018), ch. 9.
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When positioning disability intersectionally, in regards to the Scottish
Enlightenment, it is possible to see that many of the same tropes appear
when attempting to assess the ‘humanity’ of those considered Other. In par-
ticular, language, an ability to learn from experience, and the experience of
pain return as particularly dense markers of a person’s rationality and subject-
ivity. Stewart believed that language itself was not necessarily indicative of
humanity, and critiqued the conflation between ‘the gift of Speech’ and
‘the gift of Reason’ in his colleagues’ attempts to educate people who could
not communicate orally. Speech, he argued, could be taught to parrots and
starlings; what was far more important was to ‘unfold silently the latent cap-
acities of the understanding’.73 It was this capacity for understanding that
Stewart was keen to perceive in James Mitchell, partly as a way of proving a
universal argument about human capacities. Although he did not offer any
explicit conclusions regarding Mitchell’s case, Stewart suggested that his evi-
dent ability to learn from experience, despite his inability to communicate
using spoken or written language, proved that this capacity was innate to
humans. That Mitchell’s physical impairments did not prevent him from
using reason or imagination supported Stewart’s argument that it was the
human mind, rather than any specific physical attribute, that rendered
humans superior to animals.
Yet if we turn from Stewart’s account of Mitchell to his discussion of racial
difference, and particularly the nature and character of enslaved Africans, an
ambivalence sets in about the idea that all human beings had the capacity for
reason and imagination. Although Stewart believed that Africans shared the
same origins as white Europeans, he repeatedly emphasized Africans’ supposed
intellectual inferiority, stating in his lectures that ‘the intellectual powers [of
Black people] are commonly supposed to be greatly inferior to many of the
whites’.74 In contrast to Stewart’s examples of disabled Europeans, whose
ingenuity in overcoming the obstacles presented by physical impairment
enabled them to contribute to literature and art, Stewart saw no such potential
in Africans. Citing Thomas Jefferson’s Notes from Virginia, Stewart stated that
‘Mr Jefferson rates their intellectual faculties very low…He doubts much if
any of them could be made to understand a proposition of Euclid. No compos-
ition on any subject, whether in verse or prose, has been made by them.’75
Furthermore, Stewart argued that Africans, like all ‘savages’, acted only in
response to their present circumstances, and were incapable of anticipating
the future consequences of their actions: ‘it seems pretty evident that their
minds are totally occupied by their present sensations’.76 This statement
placed Africans in much closer proximity to ‘brutes’, who Stewart stated in
Outlines of Moral Philosophy ‘are incapable of looking forward to consequences
or of composing together the different gratifications of which they are suscep-
tible and accordingly, as far as we are able to perceive, they yield to every
73 Stewart, Elements, III, pp. 337–8.
74 Bridges, ‘Lectures’, pp. 355–6.
75 Bell, ‘Lectures’, p. 136.
76 Ibid., p. 31.
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present impulse’.77 In contrast, Stewart stated that James Mitchell possessed a
‘prudential sagacity’ despite his hearing, sight, and speech impairments.
Fundamental to this was Mitchell’s ability to anticipate the future based on
his experience of the past. In their final assessment of Mitchell, both
Gordon and Stewart asserted that he possessed a good memory and ‘a foresight
which enables him to look forward with dread to the possibility of future
contingencies’.78
The radical differences between Stewart’s general assessment of the abil-
ities of Africans as a ‘race’ and his sympathetic assessment of the abilities
and potential of James Mitchell complicates attempts to read racism and able-
ism as part of the same analytical framework. Whereas Stewart represented
Africans as a homogeneous and animalistic mass, the detailed analysis of
James Mitchell gave him humanity and individuality. This cannot simply be
attributed to a lack of knowledge of any individual of African descent.
Although Stewart had never visited any part of Africa, North America, or
the Caribbean, he would have been familiar with Monboddo’s Black servant,
Joseph, and probably also the writing of Ouladah Equiano.79 Rather,
Stewart’s nuanced and humanizing investigation of Mitchell’s situation, and
his homogenization of Africans as ‘savages’, represent two extremes of
Enlightenment analytical modes. The combination of Mitchell’s whiteness
and his socio-economic status informed the way that Stewart and his
Scottish Enlightenment colleagues represented his situation and potential.
As a member of an educated and ‘respectable’ Scottish family, Stewart viewed
Mitchell as an equal, whose impairments elicited his sympathy. Commentators
described his mother as an ‘intelligent and sensible lady’ and heaped praise
upon his sister Jane’s commitment to his welfare. Mitchell’s father was well
respected enough to merit a call for subscriptions towards the publication of
his sermons and an autobiography, written by Reverend Simon Fraser, upon
his death in 1812 (the book appears never to have gone to print).80 The
Mitchell family’s socio-economic status thus translated into a cultural capital
that invested Stewart and Gordon with greater hope about the potential to
‘cultivate the intellectual and moral faculties of a human being, destitute of
the two senses which are the ordinary vehicles of all our acquired knowledge’,
and informed their interpretation of Mitchell’s disability.81
Yet if we move beyond the singular and individualized case of James
Mitchell, to situate the ‘Account’ in relationship to Stewart’s wider discussion
of disability in his lectures in Moral Philosophy, it is clear that his
77 Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy. For the use of students in the University of Edinburgh
(Edinburgh, 1793), p. 103.
78 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 370.
79 James Boswell, The journal of a tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson (London, 1785), ed. Peter
Levi (London, 1984), p. 201. For the Black presence in Britain, see David Olusoga, Black and British: a
forgotten history (London, 2016); Peter Fryer, Staying power: the history of Black people in Britain
(London, 1984).
80 Advert for ‘Sermons by the Late Reverend Donald Mitchell’, in Quarterly Review (Oct. 1813),
p. 300.
81 Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 333.
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understanding of physical impairment does share some similarities with that
of racial difference. Stewart’s overall argument in Elements was that the cap-
acity to reason, to imagine, and to make generalizations were God-given,
innate, and unique to humans. Yet despite the fact that Stewart understood
every human being, supposedly regardless of embodiment, to have the cap-
acity for reason, the body itself played a fundamental role in his understanding
of the realization of that capacity. What Stewart and other philosophers called
‘countenance’, which was expressed particularly through the muscles of the
face, played an important role in revealing the inner workings of the mind.
It was for this reason that Stewart and his correspondents paid particular
attention to James Mitchell’s ‘countenance’, from which, ‘notwithstanding
his unfortunate defects’, they claimed to observe ‘the lineaments of thought’.82
Unlike the majority of deaf people in Europe, whose countenances, Stewart
claimed, were ‘generally heavy and disagreeable’ unless they were ‘instructed
to read and speak’, Mitchell appeared to have gained from his society regard-
less of the fact that he had no ‘artificial language’.83
Stewart also applied this interpretation of physicality to racial and stadial
difference. The ‘savage’, Stewart argued, spent most of his time ‘in a state of
stupid and thoughtless inactivity’, and so his features lacked the ‘sprightliness
and mobility which with us indicate a quick mind’ and possessed a ‘sleepy, lan-
guid, and dull appearance’.84 As society or an individual made progress, how-
ever, their physical countenance itself changed.85 To support his argument,
Stewart cited an observation made by Samuel Stanhope Smith’s An essay on
the causes of the variety of complexion and figure in the human species (1787),
which claimed that Africans’ hair, nose, and lip shape changed when they
were exposed to the more ‘civilized’ space of the enslavers’ household.86 (He
ignored the well-known fact that European slave-owners routinely raped and
brutalized their house slaves.87) ‘The bodily constitution of a savage hinders
him from refined speculation’, Stewart concluded, ‘but in time the Negroes
maybe as refined as we are.’88 Civilization, for disabled others and for
Africans, was to be a work in progress.
Stewart’s fundamental belief in the capacity of all humans to use reason
formed the basis of his philosophical arguments. Yet, at the same time, he ima-
gined the intellect necessary for ‘progress’ to be the particular attribute of
able-bodied, elite white men. It was only through interaction with, and instruc-
tion by, these men that other people, including disabled and Black people,
would be able to make progress: ‘The almost idiotic or situation of person is
82 Thomas Macfarlane, ‘Answers addressed to a clergyman in the county of Moray by Mr
Professor Glennie’, in Stewart, ‘Some account’, p. 314.
83 Bell, ‘Lectures’, p. 141.
84 Ibid.
85 Walker, ‘Abbreviations’, p. 364.
86 Bell, ‘Lectures’, p. 141.
87 See Diana Paton, ‘Punishment, crime and the bodies of slaves in eighteenth-century Jamaica’,
Journal of Social History, 34 (2001), pp. 923–54; Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of subjection: terror, slavery, and
self-making in nineteenth-century America (New York, NY, and Oxford, 1997).
88 Walker, ‘Abbreviations’, p. 364.
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born deaf (if pains have not been taken in removing, in some degree, this
defect, by education) further shows in what a low state the human intellect
would remain, without material interchange of sentiments.’89 Disabled people
required white, able-bodied men, to lead them down the path of progress. A
similar rationale – that Black people needed guiding towards ‘civilization’ –
underpinned the argument for the gradual amelioration, rather than outright
abolition, of slavery.90 It was necessary to consider, Stewart stated, the effect
that ‘sudden emancipation would have upon the unfortunate men themselves –
from not being accustomed to the situation – they would be ignorant of how to
conduct themselves’.91 This idea that disabled and enslaved people would
never achieve any form of ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’ without guidance from
able-bodied white men naturalized dominance, and demanded that those in
subordinate positions be grateful for the instruction that they received.92
Undoubtedly, there are many ambivalences in Stewart’s writing about both
race and disability and the relationship between the two is complex. Both dis-
ability and race could signify an imperative for ‘correction’ or ‘civilization’ and
both subverted the norms of white, Christian, able-bodied society. To say that
they were the same would be to misrepresent the specificities of each dis-
course both in Stewart’s work and in wider Enlightenment thought, but
there is certainly some reason to suggest that looking at the two in relation-
ship with each other is a useful exercise.
V
In focusing on the ‘Account’ of James Mitchell, this article has explored and
situated a text which, although little discussed in its own right, sheds a
great deal of light on Scottish Enlightenment ideas of disability. We have
argued that disability is not just a marginal curiosity in Enlightenment
thought, but that for philosophers such as Stewart, it provided an important
theoretical, philosophical, and humanitarian conundrum – a test case through
which to provide material to questions as diverse as: what is the capacity of
humanity for civilization and improvement? What role does language play in
defining the limits of humanity? And to what extent did disability disrupt
classed, raced, and gendered assumptions?
One of the implications of exploring these questions is that it challenges the
sense in which all histories of the Enlightenment can be written without con-
sideration of disability, or the marginalization of disability as an insignificant
side-issue. Recent work has demonstrated the important ways in which the
Scottish Enlightenment must be understood as a raced and gendered move-
ment, in which bodily difference not only manifested itself in the lived
89 Bell, ‘Lectures’, p. 66.
90 Catherine Hall, Civilizing subjects: metropole and colony in the English imagination, 1830–1867
(Cambridge, 2002), p. 176; Justin Roberts, Slavery and the Enlightenment in the British Atlantic, 1750–
1807 (New York, NY, 2013), pp. 47–56.
91 Anon., ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy delivered by Professor Dugald Stewart, 1789 and 1790’.
92 See George Boulukos, The grateful slave: the emergence of race in eighteenth-century British and
American culture (Cambridge, 2008).
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experience of the (largely white and male) protagonists, but also in their
thinking. Adding disability to this, and also to class as another important cat-
egory, ensures that we keep in mind the extent to which issues of disability
were more widely formative.93 Stewart and his friends were aware of this
and of the power of disability and illness to disrupt their own lives and
those of their families and friends, but they were also aware of the need to
take issues of disability seriously on a philosophical level, not just to find
out about the lives of disabled people, but to ask questions fundamental to
their understanding of what the human body and mind was capable and to
interrogate its limits. In questioning the boundaries of humanity, however,
they constructed a hierarchy of embodiment, with the able-bodied, white,
and elite man at the pinnacle, leading the path of ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’.
The consolidation of this paradigm during the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury led to disabled people being increasingly understood as defective and
aberrant, in need either of cure or assimilation to fit the norms of society,
or of being eradicated entirely. Although, if read in isolation, Stewart’s account
of James Mitchell appears as a sympathetic and humane investigation, partly
intended to help improve the life of a young man, the logic that underpinned
it laid some dangerous and deeply disturbing foundations for the future.
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